We study how changes in Diagnosis-Related Group price regulation affect hospital behaviour in quasi-markets with exclusive provision by public hospitals. Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment, we use a difference-in-differences approach to test whether public hospitals respond to an exogenous change in Diagnosis-Related Group tariffs by increasing C-section rates and/or by upcoding. Controlling for a detailed set of mother characteristics, we find that price changes did not affect the probability of a C-section. We do however find evidence of upcoding: Conditional on the birth delivery method (either a C-section or a vaginal delivery), public hospitals experiencing the largest price change exhibit a higher probability of treating patients coded as complicated. This finding suggests that even public hospitals may be sensitive to market incentives.
| INTRODUCTION
Most developed countries face increasing pressure for both improving health care quality and controlling spending growth. One common answer has been the use of market mechanisms: Although universal and comprehensive coverage is still ensured, quasi-markets-coupled with yardstick competition and prospective reimbursement systems by diagnostic categories-have been introduced since the 90s in the U.K., the Netherlands, France, Sweden, and Italy. The idea is to (re)introduce market incentives in a highly regulated sector, where publicly owned providers often prevail. It is claimed that competition can increase efficiency and improve quality (e.g., Gaynor, Moreno-Serra, & Propper, 2012; Gaynor & Town, 2012) . However, side effects may also arise, in particular hospitals' opportunistic behaviours, such as inappropriateness and upcoding, aimed to maximize reimbursements (e.g., Dranove, 2012) .
In an effort to increase the efficiency of public spending and contain public debt, the Italian government adopted the quasi-markets model in 1992. As in other countries, the national framework legislation required the separation of providers from purchasers of health services. The latter was then expected to contract with different providers (ideally, public and also private hospitals) the services for all the residents in its jurisdiction. A prospective payment system based on DiagnosisRelated Groups (DRG) was introduced. A fixed price payment mechanism replaced a cost reimbursement one for public hospitals and a fee-for-service one for private hospitals (which paid a fee for each day spent in the hospital). Lump sum payments were instead used for emergency and other specialized services. Differently from other countries, the quasi-market model in Italy resulted in large institutional differences. Given that provision of services is decentralized to regional governments, each of the 20 regions defined its own quasi-market model. Regions differ in the extent to which they separate thirdparty payers from providers, in the degree of involvement of private providers, but also in the prices paid for the services. A national listing of tariffs was proposed by the Central Government in 1994, but-coherently with the regional nature of the 2 | DATA
| Sources and variables
(with on average 500 deliveries per year) whose reimbursement tariffs did not change over time. We will refer to Group 3 as our "untreated" (or control) group, that is, the group of hospitals not affected by the tariff change in 2010.
We exploit information for four relevant DRGs: vaginal deliveries with (DRG 372) and without complications (DRG 373) and C-section with (DRG 370) and without complications (DRG 371) . Figure 1 shows the dynamics over time of the spread between the reimbursement tariffs for C-sections and vaginal deliveries (without and with complications), for the three groups of hospitals. For hospitals in Group 1, the difference in the reimbursement tariffs between a C-section and a vaginal delivery increases from euro 960 to euro 1000. For hospitals in Group 2, the spread changes from euro 915 to euro 924. In the case of complications, the C-section/vaginal delivery spread for hospitals in Group 1 shifts from euro 1420 to euro 1480, whereas for Group 2 from Euro 1350 to Euro 1364. A similar dynamics over time by hospital groups is observed for the spread between the tariffs for C-sections with and without complications and for the spread between the tariffs for vaginal deliveries with and without complications. In particular, the spread between C-sections with complications and C-section without complications increases from euro 1260 to euro 1312 (+4.1%) in Group 1, and from euro 1198 to euro 1210 (+1%) for Group 2. The differential increase for natural birth deliveries with and without complications is from euro 802 to euro 834 (+4%) for hospitals in Group 1, and from euro 762 to euro 769 (+0.9%) in Group 2.
| Descriptive statistics
Our main dependent variable is the delivery method coupled with the presence of complications. We deal with four possible outcomes: a vaginal birth without complications, a vaginal birth with complications, a C-section without complications, and a C-section with complications. A different DRG (and reimbursement tariff) is attached to each possible birth outcome. An assisted birth (use of forceps or ventouse) typically represents a complicated case for vaginal deliveries, whereas most emergency C-sections are among the complicated events. Identification of the effects of the price increase requires that trends in C-section and vaginal deliveries (with and without complications) do not differ across the three groups of hospitals before the policy change, that is, when the reimbursement tariffs were constant. Figure 2 sheds some light on the issue. The two top panels of the figure show the dynamics over time of C-section rates (number of all C-sections out of total deliveries) and complication rates (number of vaginal and C-section births with complications out of total deliveries). C-sections slightly decrease over time, especially in Groups 2 and 3 (the untreated one). C-section rates are always above 28%, and for hospitals in Group 1, the C-section rate is above 35% in all years. The complication rate shows a sharp increase in all groups of hospitals, especially after 2009. Although the average prepolicy complication rate is 3.9% for Group 1, 8.7% for Group 2, and 4.6% for the untreated group, after 2010, the three average rates jump to 9.9%, 9.8%, and 7%, respectively. Such increases are large, both in absolute and relative terms. Relative differences within and across groups are also large (e.g., for Group 1, the relative increase is +157%, whereas for the Untreated, the increase is only +52%). In our evaluation design, we are primarily interested in absolute differences in complication rates because they represent a direct measure of the impact on revenues and, hence, on spending for the regional government.
Moreover, unlike the C-section rates, the prepolicy trends for complications look very similar for the three groups of hospitals. This supports the validity of the assumption of parallel trends across groups, absent the treatment, at least when complications are considered. To further explore the issue, the two bottom panels of Figure 2 split the ratio of complicated deliveries distinguishing C-sections from vaginal deliveries. The three groups of hospital show similar trends in the prepolicy period, especially for complicated C-section rates.
Following Silverman and Skinner (2004) , we couple this evidence on complication rates with information on risky pregnancies. Table 1 reports two possible indicators of complicated cases: the Robson classification and a risk factor index, based on a number of clinical conditions of the mother (see Table 1 for definitions). We compute the average of the two indicators over time and by hospital group. Higher indexes indicate riskier pregnancies, with higher expected probabilities for a C-section delivery or a delivery with complications. Focusing on the pretreatment period, hospitals in Group 1 systematically deal with a larger number of high-risk pregnancies, whereas Group 2 and the Untreated have statistically undistinguishable risk factors. In principle, however, the difference-in-differences strategy is robust to endogenous health conditions, as long as the expected FIGURE 2 Dynamics over time of the ratios of C-sections, vaginal deliveries, and complications by hospital groups trends for complications (conditional on observables) are parallel in the absence of the policy change (Beatty & Shimshack, 2011) . We statistically test this assumption in our empirical model. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for mothers' characteristics. In terms of demographics, about 60% of mothers are between 30 and 39 years old, 67% are married, 49% have a high school degree, and 67% are employed. In relation to the clinical conditions, about 55% of deliveries are first births, 18% of mothers experienced a high-risk (pathological) pregnancy, 11% had a previous C-section, and 17% of deliveries were overdue, that is, after the 40th week of pregnancy. The average weight gain during pregnancy is 10.8 kg. The average number of previous miscarriages and pregnancy hospital admissions are 0.2 and 0.1, respectively. The distribution of mothers' characteristics shows some differences across groups of hospitals. With regard to demographic information, mothers in Group 1 are more likely to work (71% in Group 1, 66% in Group 2, and 63% in the Untreated group). They are more likely to have the lowest levels of education: The rates of women with no education are 7% in Group 1, 5% in Group 2, and 2% in the Untreated group. They are also more likely to have the highest level of education with graduated women being 20%, 18%, and 15%, respectively. Information about medical conditions also differ across groups, reflecting the evidence (as from Table 1 ) that hospitals in Group 1 deal with riskier pregnancies: Women are older and more likely to have experienced past C-sections, weight gain, miscarriages, and past hospital admissions. The proportion of pathological pregnancies, twin and breech deliveries, allergies, alcohol consumption, and preterm births is also higher for Group 1. In order to capture different casemix across hospitals, all these observable characteristics for the mother are controlled for in our regression model. Moreover, we control for time-invariant differences in casemix and treatment complexity across hospitals through hospital fixed effects.
| EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS
We investigate whether a variation of financial incentives induced by a change in DRG price regulation triggers a response by hospitals, even in a system where all providers are publicly owned. 7 In particular, we want to test the following two hypotheses:
1. Inappropriateness: when tariffs change, hospitals shift patients to higher paid diagnoses, by changing the treatment from vaginal to C-sections. 2. Upcoding: when tariffs change, hospitals shift patients to higher paid drugs, without changing any aspect of care but simply coding additional complications.
| Inappropriateness
The empirical strategy is based on the estimation of a binomial regression model. The birth delivery type is modelled as a latent variable y*, with y being the observed outcome equal to one when a C-section is performed and to zero for a natural birth. Our first main empirical specification is Note. The risk factor index is computed as the sum of the following binary variables: pathological pregnancy, twin birth, breech birth, asthma in pregnancy, allergy in pregnancy, alcohol in pregnancy, smoke in pregnancy, Rh sensitivity, delivery week below 36, delivery week above 40, and mother age above 40. Higher Robson class and risk factors signal high-risk deliveries.
( 1) where the type of birth delivery for woman i is a function of individual characteristics related to medical conditions X M i (age, pathologies, allergies, weight gain, hospital admissions, number of children, previous C-sections, etc.) and socio-demographic information X D i (education level, marital status, and working condition). We include a set of dummies for each year (μ t ), month (μ m ), and day of the week (μ w ). The hospital fixed effects (μ h ) capture time-invariant hospital characteristics, including the availability of a neonatal intensive care unit or a paediatric emergency department. G 1 and G 2 are two dummy variables for hospitals in Group 1 (larger price increase) and Group 2 (smaller price increase), respectively. post 2010 is a dummy variable equal to one for birth deliveries in the postpolicy period (from 2010 to 2012) and zero otherwise. δ 1 and δ 2 are the parameters of interest, measuring the change in the probability of having a C-section in Group 1 or 2 hospitals (when compared to the "untreated" Group 3) after the change in prices.
One possible concern with Equation 1 is that any effect on C-section rates induced by a price change may be due to changes in classifying patients with and without complications (a form of upcoding). We therefore estimate Equation 1, first without controlling for complications and then compare these estimates with those obtained once a control for patients being classified as having complications is added to the model. If the results are robust with and without inclusion of the complication dummy, then we should be able to rule out that the effect on C-sections is due to upcoding.
Second, we estimate Equation 1 separately for the two subsamples of births with and without complications. We may expect the price change to differently affect the probability of a C-section for women with and without complications.
In Table 3 , we present estimation results (linear probability models) for Equation 1. Columns 1 and 2 only differ for the inclusion of a dummy variable that controls for those deliveries coded as complicated (either vaginal or C-section). Although the dummy for complications is positive and significant, implying that, all else equal, we may expect a higher probability of C-section when a case is coded as complicated, the two interaction terms for Groups 1 and 2 are not significantly different from zero. After the policy change in 2010, hospitals do not display any difference in their C-section probabilities.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 , we consider the common trend assumption implied by Equation 1. We thus reestimate the specifications from columns 1 and 2 by including interaction terms between the two hospitals' groups' dummy variables (G 1 and G 2 ) and all year dummies, which corresponds to consider a full set of leads and lags of our treatment (i.e., the price change occurred in 2010).
8 This augmented specification allows us to test whether (a) a common trend in our dependent variable existed before the policy change and (b) the new prices exerted an impact already in the first year after their introduction, or dispatched their effects in the following years. In column 4, we also include the dummy for complicated cases, which is again positive and statistically significant. Interestingly, for hospitals in Group 1 only, all interacted terms before 2011 are positive and significant. Given that the reference year is 2007, the probability of a C-section is higher in all years, except for 2012, for hospitals in Group 1. The policy change seems not to affect the hospital behaviour as for the choice of the delivery procedure. Finally, in column 5, we include a linear time trend interacted with hospital specific dummy variables, which allows for differential time trends in C-sections across hospitals. The results are unaltered as no reaction after the policy change is again found.
| Upcoding
It may be that the observed higher probability of C-sections when a case is coded as complicated (Table 3 , columns 2, 4, and 5) hides a possible upcoding behaviour by hospitals. Indeed, in the actual practice for birth deliveries, the clinical staff usually upcode to the presence of complications after the choice of the delivery method (C-section vs. vaginal birth). Therefore, the result in Table 3 may be due to the provider upcoding more severe patients who are more likely to have a C-section. We start exploring the determinants of complications in Table 4 , where we report estimates of a linear probability model where the dependent variable is now equal to one for complicated deliveries (C-sections and vaginal) and zero for noncomplicated cases. The set of independent variables is the usual one (see Equation 1), including interaction terms between groups of hospitals and post-2010 dummy, mothers' characteristics, and the full set of year, month, weekday, and hospital fixed effects. As expected, the R 2 from this regression (0.08) is lower than in Table 3 (0.40), reflecting that complications are not well explained by our observables. The key finding from Table 4 is that the policy change produced some response from hospitals in Group 1. After the policy change, the probability of observing complicated cases increased in hospitals where the price change was larger. We also include in all specifications a dummy for C-sections, which is always positive-as expected-and statistically different from zero.
Finally, we investigate upcoding behaviour in more detail, by testing whether the price change in 2010 affects the probability of complications separately for C-section and natural births. We therefore run two regressions, one for C-section patients and one for natural births. In order to account for possible "selection effect" through the type of procedure (C-section vs. vaginal delivery), because price changes can increase the probability of a C-section, we introduce a Heckman selection-type model (Heckman, 1979) . The specification is a bivariate sample selection model 9 :
9 The notation for Equations 2 and 3 is similar to that for Equation 1: X M i collects medical conditions (see Table 2 ) and X D i socio-demographic information (see Table 2 ). μ t and λ t represent sets of dummies for year, μ m and λ m dummies for month, and μ w and λ w dummies for the day of the week. The hospital fixed effects are μ h and λ h . G 1 and G 2 are two dummy variables for hospitals in Groups 1 and 2, respectively; post 2010 is a dummy variable equal to one for deliveries in the postpolicy period (from 2010 to 2012), and zero otherwise. 
where Equation 2 is the participation equation and Equation 3 is the upcoding equation; they are simultaneously estimated by maximum likelihood, after assuming the error terms ε and u are jointly normally distributed.
We estimate Equations 2 and 3 for the two subsamples of C-sections and natural births. When estimating the model on the patients that underwent a C-section, the binary variable y equals one when a C-section occurred and zero for vaginal deliveries. Note. Mother controls (demographic information and medical conditions) are defined in Table 2 . C-section dummy is equal to one if the delivery method was a C-section. G1 is for hospitals in Group 1, and G2 is for hospitals in Group 2. Standard errors are clustered at hospital-year level. The number of observations is 216,670. *Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level.
***Significant at 1% level.
The binary variable w controls for complications: It equals one for women who underwent a C-section with complications and zero for C-section deliveries without any complications. Similarly, for the subsample of women delivering by natural birth, y is equal to one for vaginal deliveries and zero for C-sections, whereas w is equal to one if a vaginal delivery with complications is observed and zero for natural birth with no complications. Identification of the bivariate sample selection model is achieved by an exclusion restriction: Although the full set of medical and socio-demographic information (X M and X D ) may affect the participation, that is, the choice of a C-section instead of a vaginal delivery, it is reasonable to assume that only medical conditions (X M ) play a role in the decision to classify a birth as a complicated case. To support this exclusion restriction, we refer to some evidence in the medical literature on the link between delivery methods (C-section vs. natural birth) and maternal preferences, which strongly depend on socio-demographic factors such as education and occupational status of the mother (see, e.g., Charles, Whelan, & Gafni, 1999 , Coulter, 1999 , Donati, Grandolfo, & Andreozzi, 2003 . Indeed, the decision process about the delivery method with an active involvement of the patient has become increasingly acceptable; on the contrary, the decision to code the patient as complicated totally rests on physicians and only depends on mother's medical conditions (e.g., Kalish, McCullough, & Chervenak, 2006) . From a statistical point of view, the demographic variables that we exclude (the dummies for married women, working women, and education level) are neither individually nor jointly significant at conventional statistical levels in the upcoding equation, although they are all significant in the C-section equation and with the expected sign. We also implement some additional likelihood ratio tests on the validity of our exclusion restriction. We estimate Equations 2 and 3 in the perfectly identified version (where the same set of covariates enter both the participation and the upcoding equations) and compare it to the model where the exclusion restriction is introduced. The exclusion restriction is never rejected, at any conventional significance level. Tables 5 and 6 report results from the Heckman-type model in Equations 2 and 3: Whereas Table 5 considers the coding decision within C-section births, Table 6 considers the coding decision within vaginal deliveries. In columns 1 of Tables 5  and 6 , the main finding is that the policy change did not affect the delivery method (participation equation), which is in line with Table 3 , but it triggered some response in the coding practice (upcoding equation). All else equal, hospitals in Group 1 (experiencing larger price changes) show a higher probability of complicated cases (upcoding), both in the case of vaginal and C-section deliveries, and the effect is stronger for C-sections. Surprisingly, hospitals in Group 2 have a reduced probability of complicated C-sections after the policy change, which is even lower than for the "untreated" group of hospitals (Table 5 , column 1). All else equal, for hospitals in Group 1, the probability of a C-section with complications is higher than the probability of a C-section without complications by five percentage points (Table 5 , column 1), whereas the probability of a vaginal delivery with complications is higher than a vaginal delivery without complications by two percentage points (Table 6 , column 1).
In columns 2 of Tables 5 and 6 , we include a full set of leads and lags of our treatment. As with respect to the participation equation, we confirm results from Table 3 : For hospitals in Group 1, almost all interactions are significantly different from zero, and no response after the policy change is actually detected. In the upcoding equation for C-sections (Table 5 , column 2), point estimates for Group 2 are decreasing over time, even if never significant. Instead for Group 1, coefficients are zero in the years before the price change, then they are positive in 2010 (marginally significant at the 11% level) and in 2011 (significant at conventional level), and finally they come back to the prepolicy level in 2012. For natural births (Table 6 , column 2), coefficients for Group 2 in the upcoding equation are always zero, whereas coefficients for Group 1 are increasing in the postpolicy years 2011 and 2012. Overall, the policy triggered some reaction in hospitals that experienced high price changes (Group 1), although its effect seems limited to the first 2 years after the change.
Finally, columns 3 from Tables 5 and 6 report results when we include the interaction between a linear trend and the full set of hospital dummies. Although the upcoding effect disappears for vaginal deliveries, upcoding is still present and even larger when compared to column 1 for C-sections. The probability of observing a complicated C-section is higher by 6.7 percentage points in public hospitals where the price change was larger (Group 1 in Table 5 , column 3).
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10 The degree of correlation (ρ) between the error terms in the participation and the upcoding equations presented in Table 6 is not significantly different from zero in all specifications, pointing to absence of selection. We use ordinary least squares to fit the upcoding equation for natural births (complicated vs. noncomplicated), and we obtain results similar to those displayed in Table 6 .
We are aware that our results could be affected by ecological fallacy, due to inference about the individuals' behaviour drawn from aggregate data (Freedman, 2004) . However, ecological fallacy is substantially reduced in our estimated model, as the observational unit is a single childbirth, and we are able to include a large number of observable demographic and medical conditions of the mother. Still, ecological fallacy may arise from aggregating hospitals in three groups. For this reason, we experiment with alternative groupings, in particular splitting Group 1, because this is the group mostly affected by the price increase. Results are almost unchanged, and evidence of upcoding is still found in all hospitals that experienced the highest tariff change. Note. The dependent variable in the participation equation is 1 for a C-section and 0 for a vaginal delivery, whereas the dependent variable in the upcoding equation is 1 for a C-section with complications and 0 for a C-section without complications. Mother controls (demographic information and medical conditions) are defined in Table 2 . G1 is for hospitals in Group 1, and G2 is for hospitals in Group 2. Participation and upcoding equations are jointly estimated using full maximum likelihood. ρ is an estimate of the correlation among the errors in the upcoding equation and the participation equation, whereas [p val] is the p value from a Wald test where the null is that the ρ correlation is actually zero. Standard errors are clustered at hospital-year level.
*Significant at 10% level **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level.
| CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the response of hospitals to exogenous changes in DRG price regulation, focusing on health care markets with exclusive provision of birth deliveries by public producers. We identify three groups of hospitals according to the observed degree of price variation. We then use medical and socio-demographic data on all women giving birth in one Italian region over a 6-year time span, 3 years before and 3 years after the policy change. We focus on four DRGs-vaginal deliveries with and without complications, and C-section deliveries with and without complications-and test whether in response to a relative price increase, hospitals are more likely (a) to provide a C-section and (b) to shift patients to higher paid DRGs to increase their reimbursements. Note. The dependent variable in the participation equation is 1 for a vaginal delivery and 0 for a C-section delivery, whereas the dependent variable in the upcoding equation is 1 for a vaginal delivery with complications and 0 for a vaginal delivery without complications. Mother controls (demographic information and medical conditions) are defined in Table 2 . G1 is for hospitals in Group 1, and G2 is for hospitals in Group 2. Participation and upcoding equations are jointly estimated using full maximum likelihood. ρ is an estimate of the correlation among the errors in the upcoding equation and the participation equation, whereas [p val] is the p value from a Wald test where the null is that the ρ correlation is actually zero. Standard errors are clustered at hospital-year level. *Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level.
Consistently with previous literature (e.g., Dafny, 2005; Januleviciute et al., 2016; Silverman & Skinner, 2004) , our analysis suggests that changes in DRG prices have an impact on hospital behaviour and influence the choice of DRG. Compared to existing studies, we find a price response even in a market where all hospitals are public. This is to some extent surprising because a priori financial incentives are expected to play a minor role for public providers, due to possible soft budget constraints and the lack of competition with private hospitals. We find evidence of upcoding for hospitals that experienced the largest price change: These show a higher probability of reporting patients with complications, both for vaginal and C-section deliveries, with a larger magnitude for the latter. Instead changes in DRG prices do not affect the probability of having a C-section. Hence, the variation in price regulation does not seem to exert any impact on the inappropriateness of health care treatments.
It is worth highlighting that the presence of upcoding as a response to changes in price regulation is detected despite observed price increases being relatively small (4% for the group subject to the highest increase in price). This finding suggests that even public hospitals may be sensitive to market incentives and take care of balancing the budget. This is even more plausible within a context, such as the Italian NHS, where external audits are virtually absent. 11 In the period analysed here, this behaviour is likely to be due to the more austere financial climate triggered by the worldwide crisis since 2008 and the tighter constraints on public finances imposed at the European level.
